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Fertility and mortality decline are major drivers of Iran's population aging. A 
rapid and sharp fall in fertility rates over the past three decades as well as a 
substantial rise in life expectancy are causing rapid aging of Iran’s population.  
The present paper uses the 2015 United Nations Population Division data 
to discuss the trends, determinants and the implications of population aging in 
Iran. According to the medium fertility variant, people age 60 and older will 
represent 31 percent (almost 29 million people) of Iran’s population by 2050. 
The population age 65 and older is projected to be 22 percent (more than 20 
million) and that of aged 80 and older 3.8 percent (around 3.5 million) in 2050, 
that are almost four-times the corresponding figures in 2015. Data on the 
speed of population aging show that Iran is the second fastest aging country in 
the world in terms of the percentage point increase in the population age 60 
and over between 2015 and 2050; Iran is second only to South Korea, by less 
than .01 percent.  
The rapid population aging of Iran has significant implications for all 
societal institutions and decision makers that have to be addressed by the 
Iranian society. Gender-related issues and socio-economic security in old age 
are two key issues resulting from such a fast population aging. As with many 
rapidly aging populations, Iran needs a strategy for social and economic 
support for an aging population that will not promote views of aging people as 
a burden. 
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1 Introduction and background 
Iran’s 79 million people in 2015 made it the 17th most populous country in the 
globe. Based on the medium fertility variant, its population size is projected to 
be around 92 million in 2050 but will decline to 70 million in 21002; even with 
the decline projected for the next century, Iran is still among countries with 
large populations, ranking 19th and 26th in the world in 2050 and 2100, 
respectively (UN Population Division, 2015a). In addition, despite the fact that 
Iran’s Total Fertility Rate (TFR) has been below the replacement level fertility 
rate (TFR<2.1) since 2000 (UN Population Division, 2015b), Iran’s natural 
growth rate is expected to remain positive through 2050 due to the population 
momentum of an increasing number of women in child-bearing ages, a 
consequence of earlier episodes of high fertility.  
Due to very rapid demographic changes in the past, especially a significant 
fertility decline along with the rise in life expectancy, Iran's population is 
rapidly aging. Iran's government officials are already concerned about 
population aging. For instance, while Iran has had one of the most effective, 
successful, and comprehensive family planning policies since the beginning of 
the 1990s, recently the country aimed to implement rash and sometimes 
punitive pronatalist policies to boost the birth rate. One of the justifications for 
considering the new policies is population aging. The issue of population aging 
has moved to the centre stage of policy-making in the country, shaping new 
policies and /or revoking the old one. There is an urgent need for information 
about the scope and trajectory of Iran’s population aging and its implications 
for policies and decision-making. This paper fills some of the gaps in our 
knowledge about population aging and its implications in Iran. Most of the 
previous studies have been based on old data and projections. For instance, on 
the basis of the world population aging:1950-2050 (UN, 2002) report, Amini, 
Rusk-Ingman, and Sahaf (2013) indicated that people age 60+ and 65+ are 
predicted to represent 21.7 percent and 14.7 percent of Iran’s population, 
respectively. However, according to the medium fertility variant in more recent 
analyses, the populations age 60+ and 65+ are projected to represent around 
31 percent and 22 percent, respectively, in 2050. The differences in these 
projections are significant enough to necessitate the use of the most recent 
                                                 
1 The authors: Nader Mehri, Ph.D. student in Social Gerontology, Miami University, 
Oxford, Ohio. mehrin@miamioh.edu; Mahmood Messkoub, International Institute of 
Social Studies of Erasmus University (ISS), The Hague, Netherlands. 
messkoub@iss.nl; Suzanne Kunkel, Scripps Gerontology Center and Department of 
Sociology & Gerontology, Miami University, Oxford, Ohio. kunkels@miamioh.edu  
2 The major reason for the population decrease is the disappearance of the 
"momentum effect" in 2050; a term to be discussed in greater detail later.  
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data to understand the scope and trajectory of Iran’s population aging. In 
addition to the use of current data, the present paper is an improvement over 
previous analyses that used a stationary population model. This paper takes 
into account a dynamic approach to address Iran’s population aging. Following 
Bloom et al. (2011), we calculate the percentage point increase in the 
population age 60 and older, age 65 and older as well as age 80 and older 
among countries with the 2015 population of 1 million or over between 2015 
and 2050. These percentages can be seen as a proxy for the speed of 
population aging that can provide useful information on the dynamics and 
pace of Iran’s population aging in a global context.  
Using the 2015 United Nations Population Division data (UN Population 
Division, 2015b), the present study discusses the scope and trajectory of Iran’s 
population aging as well as its implications. More specifically, the purposes of 
this paper are 1) to provide updated projections for the aging of Iran’s 
population, 2) to examine the role of fertility policies and behaviours in 
shaping those trends and projections, 3) to look at the intersection of fertility 
and mortality changes in shaping those trends and projections, 4) to investigate 
the speed of Iran’s population aging in a global context, and 5) to discuss the 
implications of Iran’s population aging and  policy challenges in coping with 
those implications.  
1.1  Demographic transition and population aging: two 
faces of the same coin  
One of the most significant achievements of humanity in the 20th century has 
been to increase life expectancy around the world, especially in the low and 
middle-income countries. This was a direct consequence of lowering infant and 
child mortality through the widespread introduction of public health measures 
such as vaccination, improved sanitation and nutrition.  
Another major development in the low and middle-income countries has 
been the decline in fertility that has been happening at varying speed in 
different countries. The inevitable consequence of low fertility and mortality is 
an increase in the proportion of older people in the population. A similar trend 
started earlier in the high-income countries, with some important differences. 
In the absence of modern preventive medicine, mortality decline in high-
income countries was more a consequence of, inter alia, gradual improvement 
in sanitation, clean water and other public health measures, while fertility 
decline was primarily due to urbanization, increased age of marriage, and 
changes to the family structure. This resulted in a gradual increase in the share 
of old people in the population.  
The speed of aging in high-income countries has been much slower than 
that in the low and middle-income countries. For example, it took 115 years in 
France for the share of those 65 of years of age and older in the total 
population to double from 7 to 14 percent (He, Goodkind, and Kowal, 2016), 
compared with 23 years in China and 17 years in Iran (See Figure 4, and 
references therein). The slow pace of aging in high-income countries was  
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accompanied by the gradual emergence of the institutions of retirement and 
pension systems that initially were limited to the military, police and others 
who were at the service of the emerging nation-states in the 18th and 19th 
centuries3. From the late 19th century benefits of formal retirement and state 
pension schemes were gradually extended to other citizens, first starting in 
Germany under the well-known Bismarck's pension plan. Private savings and 
pension plans have also been encouraged through the variety of life insurance 
plans; that required regulatory frameworks to protect savers and retirees' assets. 
In short, the high-income countries had the time and institutional space to 
manage, albeit in piecemeal fashion, the gradual aging of the population. This 
contrasts with the situation in the low and middle-income countries where the 
institutional and regulatory infrastructure lag behind the fast-aging population.  
It is not surprising that this rapid population aging has been viewed by 
some international institutions such as the World Bank and policymakers in 
some countries, including Iran, as a crisis4. The ‘crisis' however has different 
meanings for different people. For most institutions, countries and 
policymakers, one crisis is the dependency of the old on the working age 
population and the financing implications of this dependency in relation to the 
raising of revenue and taxation. However, for others, in countries like Iran, 
population aging is viewed as a strategic threat of reduced population, 
irrespective of the fact that the population of these countries will be increasing 
for another 50 years before they settle down to their 2018 level in about 80 
years time! Moreover, according to the UN estimates, the working age 
population in Iran is going to increase in the next 50 years, that if they were to 
be employed productively, they could provide the resources for the strategic 
needs of the country in any field - civilian or military.  
The challenge is not about how to increase fertility through pro-natalist 
policies, but how to increase production (and productivity) through the 
employment of those who are already born and productive utilization of the 
labour of the old. Iran should plan to take advantage of this demographic 
dividend if it were to overcome its current economic and social problems. 
 
                                                 
3 For an excellent review of the historical development of old-age care pensions see 
Troyansky (2016) and for a historical review of pension and life insurance in the 
USA see Weaver (1987).  
4 See, e.g., World Bank (1994).  
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2 Iran's demographic transition: the intersection of  
fertility and mortality changes 
2.1  Iran’s population growth rate and fertility policies  
Iran implemented two fertility policies within a little less than three decades. 
Population policy was in favour of population rise and fertility increase until 
1962 (Mirzaee, 2004). Due to decreasing infant and child mortality rates as well 
as improved public health, Iran’s annual population growth rate and the TFR 
increased to 2.6 percent and 6.91 children per women, respectively between 
1960 and 1965 (UN Population Division, 2015b). The increase prompted 
Iran’s government to implement the first family planning program in 1967 to 
cope with the rise in fertility and population growth rates. Although the 
government directly and entirely supported the program, Iran’s social, cultural 
and religious context was not ready for accepting the new policy and therefore 
it did not achieve its goals completely (Mirzaee, 2004). The TFR decreased by 
around 0.6 children per woman reaching 6.3 in 1975-1980 (UN Population 
Division, 2015b). Days after the Islamic Revolution in 1979, the Islamic 
government dismantled the program for over a decade and pursued pro-
natalist population policies. This significant shift was made in policy because 
the Islamic government considered the program as a dictated western policy 
and found it unfit with Islamic thoughts; spreading Islamic thought, 
encouraging the early marriage, decreasing the legal age of marriage, and Iraq's 
war against Iran facilitated the significant shift in policy (Abbasi_Shavazi and 
Hoseini_Chavoshi 2011). As a result, the TFR increased to about 6.53 children 
per woman within five years after the revolution in 1980-1985.  
Due to a substantial and continuous decline in mortality rates, especially 
infant and child mortality, as well as a rise in fertility rate, Iran’s natural 
population growth rate peaked at 3.1 percent in 1980-1985. Forced migration 
of Afghanis and Iraqis as a result of conflict increased Iran’s population growth 
rate to almost 4 percent. To cope with such unprecedented population growth, 
Iran launched a new family planning program in 1988 with three objectives: 
delaying first pregnancy, discouraging pregnancy for women under 18 and over 
35 years of age, and limiting family size to three children (Saadat, Chowdhury, 
and Mehryar 2010). Some of the features of the new policy were: providing all 
kinds of contraceptives for men and women for free, providing free vasectomy 
operations, as well as huge propaganda on the merits of having small family 
sizes throughout the country (Ghobadi, 2010). The program was supported by 
Iran’s religious leaders and encouraged by international agencies and it was 
successful beyond the expectations; the natural growth rate dropped 1.28 
percent and TFR went down to two children per woman, between 2000 and 
2005. It should be noted that Iran’s fertility decline cannot be totally credited 
to the government’s family program (Abbasi-Shavazi, 2001). As Mirzaee (2004) 
has pointed out, in addition to the successful family planning program, socio- 
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demographic factors, such as rapid decline in infant and child mortality rates, 
delayed marriage, increased education of women, the rise in the cost of raising 
children, rapid urbanization, as well as the increase of public awareness about 
demographic issues played their parts to reduce fertility decline over the last 
few decades. We should also add other factors including women 
empowerment and taking control of their pregnancies, despite their loss of 
power in other areas of their social and private lives. 
Figure 1 illustrates the intersection of fertility change and continued 
population growth rate in Iran from 1950-1955 to 2045-2050. Iran's natural 
growth rate peaked at 3.1 in 1980-1985 percent and then dropped to 1.3 
percent in 2005-2010. In fact, the decline in Iran's population growth rate 
coincided with the beginning of the fertility transition. This confirms that from 
1985 onwards, fertility has been one of the major drivers of Iran’s population 
natural growth rate. Based on the medium fertility variant, Iran’s natural 
growth rate is expected to decline to virtually zero percent in 2045-2050. In 
addition, from 2050 onwards, it is anticipated to decrease to less than zero 
percent. 
Figure 1 
The intersection of fertility change and continued natural growth rate  
from 1950-1955 to 2045-2050 (medium fertility variant)  
 
Note: the UN, DESA projections are based on the medium-variant projection 
demographic technique that uses a probabilistic method taking account of past fertility 
experiences of a country and its future changes. For further details see:  
https://population.un.org/wpp/DefinitionOfProjectionVariants/. 
 
Source: Authors’ compilation based on United Nations, Department of Economic and 




2.2 Population momentum and its impact on Iran's 
population changes 
As shown in Figure 1, Iran’s natural growth rate slightly increased by 0.07 
percent, rising from 1.28 % to 1.34 % over the 2000-2005 and 2010-2015 
periods. The growth rate was increasing as the TFR was decreasing to below 
the replacement fertility rate (TFR<2.1) over the 2000-2005 and 2010-2015 
periods, due to the population momentum. Generally, in any population, if the 
TFR is below the replacement level fertility rate then each generation will be 
smaller than the previous one. Sustained TFR that is below the replacement 
level fertility rate will ultimately result in a negative natural growth rate. 
However, on the contrary to this expectation, from 2000 onwards, Iran’s 
population growth rate has slightly increased. This happens when a momentum 
factor is larger than one, reflecting the youthfulness of the current population 
age structure in Iran. According to Preston, Heuveline and Guillot (2001) 
“typically, a momentum factor larger than 1 is said to reflect the youthful age 
structure of the population on which replacement-level fertility is imposed” (p. 
165). The more rapid and substantial shift in TFR will lead to a greater 
momentum factor. 
Iran’s population momentum has significantly affected both the natural 
growth rate and the population size. As shown in Figure 1, from 2000 
onwards, Iran’s natural population growth rate was positive though the TFR 
was below the replacement fertility rate. The effect of the momentum factor is 
expected to persist in Iran’s population structure by 2050, keeping Iran’s 
growth rate positive. Iran’s population size also is expected to increase by 
almost 13 million people between 2015 and 2050, reaching around 92 million 
in 2050. From 2050 onwards, the population size would gradually decline to 70 
million in 2100. Since the population growth rate is expected to be negative 
from 2050 onward, it can be concluded that the effect of population 
momentum on population growth will be void in 2050, if Iran’s TFR remains 
below the replacement level.   
 
2.3 The determinants of population aging in Iran: fertility 
and mortality changes  
The TFR has significantly decreased in Iran over the last three decades. The 
UN Population Division (2009) described it as the largest percentage decline in 
the world over the 1975-1980 and 2005-2010 periods. According to the UN 
World Fertility Report (2014), “in Iran Total Fertility [Rate] declined from a 
maximum of 6.9 children per woman in 1960 to 1.9 children per woman in 
2005; that is, a decline in total fertility of more than 1.1 children per woman 
per decade” (p.5). Figure 2 depicts the variations in Iran’s TFR and life 
expectancy at birth based on the medium fertility variant between 1950 and 
2050. Iran’s TFR was 7 children per woman in the 1950-1955 period that 
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decreased to 6 children per woman in the 1970-1975 period. Save for a small 
increase to 6.53 children per woman in the 1980-1985 period, it continued its 
decline dropping to 1.97 children in the 2000-2005 period which is below the 
replacement level fertility rate. In fact, the TFR decreased by 70 percent over a 
25-year period (from the early 1980s to mid-2000s). 
Figure 2 
Iran’s total fertility rate (medium fertility variant) and life expectancy, 1950-2050  
 
 
Source: Authors’ compilation based on United Nations, Department of 
Economic and Social Affairs (2015a). 
Life expectancy increased in virtually every single year between 1950-1955 
and 2045-2050. Life expectancy at birth was almost 40 years in 1950-1955, 
increased by 17 years, reaching around 57 years in 1975-1980. Due to an eight-
year war with Iraq, life expectancy dropped to 52 years in 1980-1985. Since 
then, it has gradually increased reaching 73 years in 2005-2010 and 75 years in 
2010-2015, respectively. According to the 2015 revision of the World 
Population Prospects, Iran’s life expectancy is projected to be approximately 
80 years in 2050 (UN Population Division, 2015). Despite the fact that the 
fertility transition began after the mortality transition, it declined much faster, 
making Iran's population aging very rapidly. 
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3 Population aging trends in Iran  
3.1 Iran’s population by 60+, 65+, and 80+ age groups 
between 1950 and 2050 
Figure 3 illustrates the percentage of Iran’s population in the 60+, 65+, and 
80+ age groups between 1950 and 2050. The percentage of aged 60 and older 
was 8.2 percent in 1950, slightly decreased to 5.3 percent and almost 5 percent 
in 1970 and 1980, respectively. From 1980 onwards, it has continuously 
increased, jumping to nearly 8 percent in 2015. According to the medium 
fertility variant, the proportion 60 and older it is expected to increase to around 
20 percent in 2040 and to almost 31 percent in 2050, projected four-fold 
increase by 2050. People age 60 and over will number around 29 million out of 
a total population of 92 million by 2050. The percentage aged 80 and over was 
negligible (0.5 percent) until 2000. The percentage is expected to jump to 2.4 
percent and 3.8 percent in 2040 and 2050, respectively. People age 80 and over 
will number around 3.5 million out of a total population of 92 million by 2050.  
Figure 3 
The percentage of aged 60 years and older, 65 years and older  
and 80 years and older in Iran, 1950-2050 (medium fertility variant) 
 
 
Source: Authors’ compilation based on United Nations, Department of Economic 




Kunkel, Brown, and Whittington (2014) identified the point at which 
people age 60 and older outnumber children younger than age 15 as a 
demographically revolutionary situation with social, cultural, economic, and 
political consequences. According to the medium fertility variant, it is expected 
that the population age 60 and older will outnumber children younger than age 
15 in Iran by around 2035. Therefore, Iran will be in a truly revolutionary 
situation by around 2035. 
 
3.2 Iran’s aging indicators: median age and dependency 
ratios (1950 to 2050) 
Table 1 depicts Iran’s aging indicators on the basis of estimates and projections 
made by the UN Population Division (2015) in selected years from 1950 to 
2050. The median age of 21.9 years in 1950 gradually decreased by almost 4.7 
years between 1950 and 1990, reaching 17.2 years in 1990. Since then, it is 
continuously increasing to 40.9 years in 2040 and 44.7 years in 2050.  
Table 1 
Aging indicators in Iran, selected years (medium fertility variant) 
Indicators 1950 1970 1990 2000 2010 2015 2020 2030 2040 2050 
Total Population  
(thousands) 
17119 28514 56169 65850 74253 79109 83403 88529 91205 92219 
Population aged 0-14  
(percentage) 
36.3 44.1 45.4 34.9 23.5 23.6 23.3 17.9 14.5 14.9 
Population aged 15-64  
(percentage) 
58.5 52.6 51.3 60.8 71.6 71.3 70.4 72.4 71.6 63.0 
Population aged 60+  
(percentage) 
8.2 5.3 5.4 6.2 7.1 8.2 9.9 14.4 20.7 31.2 
Population aged 65+  
(percentage) 
5.3 3.3 3.3 4.2 4.9 5.1 6.3 9.7 13.9 22.0 
Population aged 80+  
(percentage) 
0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.2 2.4 3.8 
Median age  
(years)  
21.9 17.7 17.2 20.8 26.9 29.5 32.4 38.3 40.9 44.7 
Total dependency ratio  
(per 100)  
71.1 90.1 95 64.4 38.7 40.2 42 38.1 39.7 58.6 
Child dependency ratio  
(per 100)  
62.1 83.9 88.5 57.4 32.8 33.1 33.1 24.7 20.3 23.7 
Old-age dependency ratio  
(per 100)  
9 6.3 6.5 6.9 6.9 7.1 8.9 13.4 19.4 34.9 
 






The total dependency ratio is calculated as the population age 0-14 plus 
aged 65 and over divided by the working-age population (15-64 age group). 
Iran’s total dependency ratio was almost 71 percent in 1950 and grew to 95 
percent in 1990. This means that there were 95 people age 0-14 and age 65 and 
older per 100 people age 15 to 64 years in 1990. After that, the figure decreases 
to about 40, with some fluctuation around that number.  Besides the notable 
decrease in the total dependency ratio, there is significant demographic change 
reflected in the extent to which children and older people contribute to the 
total ratio.  
From 1990 onwards, the child dependency and old-age dependency ratios 
have moved in opposite directions in almost every year. The child dependency 
ratio was 62 children to every 100 working-age people in 1950, gradually 
increased to around 84 in 1980, and peaking in 1990 at 88.5 children per 100 
working-age people. From 1990 onwards, it continuously decreases to the 
lowest percentage at almost 24 percent in 2050. The old-age dependency ratio 
is expected to increase to 8.9 and 13.4 in 2020 and 2030, respectively. The 
sharp rise in the old age dependency ratio from around 9 per 100 in 2020 to 
around 35 in 2050 is expected to significantly influence Iran’s economy in 
general and the pension system in particular. Iran has more than 30 years to 
prepare for its fast-aging population by taking advantage of the demographic 
dividend offered by its current young population.   
3.3 Iran’s population aging in a global context  
Table 2 provides a snapshot view of the speed of aging in some of the fastest 
aging countries in the world between 2015 and 2050. Iran is the second fastest 
aging country in the world in terms of the percentage point increase in the 
population aged 60 and over between 2015 and 2050. Iran also is expected to 
take 7th place in the world with the highest percentage point increase in the 
population age 65 and older between 2015 and 2050.  
Results also show that most of the countries with the largest percentage 
point increase in the population aged 60 and older and as well as aged 65 and 
older between 2015 and 2050 are projected to be among developing countries, 
mostly located in Asia including the Middle Eastern countries. However, most 
of the countries with the highest percentage point increase in the population 
age 80 and older between 2015 and 2050 are projected to be in developed 
European countries. None of the Middle Eastern countries including Iran are 
expected to be among the top 15 countries with the highest point increase in 
the population age 80 and older. 
He, Goodkind, and Kowal (2016) proposed “the number of years for a 
country’s population aged 65 and over to double from 7 percent of the total 
population to 14 percent as a commonly used indicator for the speed of 
population aging” (p. 12). As shown in Figure 4, in France, it took 115 years 
the percentage of aged 65 and older to increase from 7 percent to 14 percent 
(1865 to 1980), and it will take an additional 42 years for the percentage to 
increase from 14% to 21% (1980 to 2020). In South Korea, as the first rapidly 
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aging country in the world, the percentage is expected to double in 2018 and to 
triple in 2027. In other words, the doubling of the percentage is already 
underway in South Korea, where it is expected to end in 2018. In the case of 
Iran, based on medium fertility variant, the percentage is projected to double 
within 17 years and triple within 26 years.  
Table 2 
The world’s top 10 countries with the highest percentage point increase in elderly 
population, 2015-2050 (medium fertility variant) 
Rank Country 60+ Rank Country 65+ Rank Country 80+ 
1. South Korea 23.0  Singapore 22.2  Singapore 11.4 




3. Singapore 22.5  Thailand 19.6  Cuba 10.8 
4. Thailand 21.3  Cuba 18.7  Germany 8.8 




21.1  Spain 17.0  Spain 8.0 
7. Cuba 20.3  Iran 17.0  Portugal 7.9 
8. Oman 20.2  
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
16.6  Austria 7.8 
9. Bahrain 19.8  Poland 16  Thailand 7.8 
10. Lebanon 18.5  Oman 15.3  Chile 7.6 
- World 9.3 - World 7.8 - World 2.8 
- - - - - - - Iran 2.9 
Note: Some of the percentages look similar due to rounding decimals to nearest tenth; none 
of the listed countries are in the same rank.  





                                                 




The number of years for percentage aged 65 and older in total population to double 
and triple: selected countries 
 
Source: Iran’s data is based on authors’ calculation using United Nations Population Division Data, 
Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2015a). The data on the countries listed in the graph were 




4 Social and economic challenges of  population aging in 
Iran 
As one of the fastest aging countries in the world (see Figure 4), with a tripling 
of the number of 65 years of age and over from 2.8 million in 2000 to 9 million 
in 2030 (see Table 1), Iran faces social and economic challenges.  All aging 
societies face these challenges, but for Iran, these issues are arising in a context 
of intense internal economic problems of poverty, inequality, youth 
unemployment, as well as political and cultural conflicts. Two key challenges 
are gender-related issues and socio-economic security in old age. 
4.1  Iran’s population aging and gender-related issues 
One of the first issues to consider is the gender life expectancy gap. Iran has 
had an interesting life expectancy trajectory in the past 70 years. In the 1950s, 
male life expectancy (at 43 years) was five years higher than female’s (at 38 
years); by the late 1970s, that gap had narrowed to 3 years (52 years for males 
and 48 years for females). This gap was typical of low and middle-income 
countries. Following the Iran-Iraq war of 1979-1987 that resulted in at least 
134,000 deaths and 60,000 missing (Ferretti 1990) of exclusively male armed 
forces and combatants, Iran male life expectancy dropped to 50 years and that 
of females went up to 58 years. By 2015 this gap narrowed down to one year 
(74 for men, 75 for women); it has been estimated that this gap will widen to 
two years (76 for males and 78 for females) by 2030 (UN, 2015). This is a 
typical gender life expectancy gap in the low and middle-income countries 
(WHO 2014, World Health Statistics 2014, pp. 42-44). 
Such age gaps in life expectancy matter for the socio-economic security of 
men and women as they age. In general, the male breadwinner model, male 
asset ownership within households, subordinate position of women in society, 
and gender pay gaps undermine women’s independent capacity to accumulate 
assets and entitlement to welfare and pension rights. The situation is worse in 
countries where gender discrimination has deeper institutionalized roots.  
In a patriarchal society like Iran, the gap in the socio-economic security of 
men and women starts much earlier in life and carries through their life until 
old age. Despite the fact that there is a little gap between men and women with 
regard to school attendance, literacy, university graduation and other areas of 
human development, labour force participation for women age 20 and above 
was 15.2 percent in urban areas and 12.9 percent in rural areas in 2006. Those 
rates were significantly higher among males; 79.4 percent in urban areas and 
85.4 percent in rural areas (Salehi Esfahani and Shajari, 2010). Lack of labour 
force participation limits women’s accumulation of assets in their own right. 
There is also a long list of legal barriers to women’s pursuit of economic 
independence such as the need for the consent of husband to employment.  
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Gender pay gap, as well as most women being employed in the low paid jobs 
compared with men further, undermines their independent economic position.  
Another example is the Islamic inheritance law which entitles female 
siblings to half the share of male siblings. Moreover, wives are entitled to a tiny 
share of the family asset after the death of their husband but are entitled to the 
deceased's occupational and state (social insurance based) pension. However, 
formal pensions in Iran cover mostly the formal sector including government 
employees. Women’s dependent economic position continue throughout their 
lives and weakens following the divorce or the death of their husband. Female-
headed households comprise a large section of the poor households in Iran 
(Shadi Talab, 2004). Women in Iran face the prospect of an economically 
vulnerable old age and the expectation that they will bear responsibilities for 
caregiving throughout their lives.   
4.2 Iran’s population aging and socio-economic security in 
old age 
Socio-economic security and welfare in old age are based on a combination 
of accumulated resources: income from labour, assets including own pension 
savings, family support in- kind or cash, and institutional support from the 
state and employers in the form of state and work-based pensions, health 
coverage and other benefits. The relative contribution of the above sources to 
the welfare of the old people in Iran varies significantly across different socio-
economic groups. In general, richer households rely on their resources while 
the middle and lower socio-economic groups have to rely on family and 
government-based institutional support.  
Iran does not have a universal age-related or citizen-based pension scheme 
(like state pension in Europe or social security in the US). However, it has a 
range of employment-related pension schemes that are managed either by the 
Social Security Organisation (Ministry of Cooperatives, Labour, and Social 
Welfare) for private sector employees or various state pension schemes for 
civil servants, armed forces and other government employees. Some of these 
institutions have a long history and date back to the establishment of the 
modern state infrastructure in the early 20th century. Since the Revolution of 
1979 several institutions have been established that offer support to the family 
of those who died during the Iran-Iraq war (e.g., Martyr – Shahid – 
Foundation) or support families who are on meagre income or are without any 
able-bodied male breadwinner (Imam Assistance Committee – Komiteh 
Emdad Emam). Their support is means- tested with the former covering 1.5 
million and the latter 0.5 million in 2016. There are also religious endowments 
that are expected to use the proceeds of their endowments that in some case 
are vast, like the foundation based on the endowment of the Eighth Imam in 
Mashhad known in Farsi as Astan Ghods Razavi.  
The formal pension schemes cover mainly men given the male 
dominated structure of the formal employment in Iran, but women do inherit 
the pension of their deceased partners. There is a great deal of variation in the 
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adequacy of pensions, which depend largely on the final salary/income. For 
example, the high-ranking civil servants, military and police officers who retire 
on high final salaries do have a reasonably adequate pension, but the majority 
of pensioners struggle to cover their basic living expenses. In recent years there 
have been widespread demonstrations by pensioners protesting against 
inadequate pensions due to high inflation.  
Finally, there is also the near-universal cash transfer scheme of Iran 
(Yaraneh Naghdi) that currently pays 450,000 rials (about US$3.75 at the 
exchange rate of 120000 rials to a dollar in July 2019) a month to every Iranian 
citizen who have to register to receive it6. By default, the older Iranians are a 
beneficiary of the cash transfer scheme.  However, a cash transfer of this 
amount is totally inadequate to cover the basic needs of food, clothing, 
healthcare and housing of an older person.  
                                                 
6 The Iranian government has tried to close the cash transfer scheme to those on 
higher income like medical doctors, lawyers, top management and other highly paid 




The speed of aging in Iran is truly remarkable, its population of 65 years and 
over will triple in 26 years (2023 – 2049) compared with 157 years in France, 
100 years in the UK and 89 years in the US) (see figure four). Iran is ill-
prepared for such a rapid population aging, it neither has the economic 
foundation of these other countries nor has the financial and institutional 
infrastructure that these countries developed over many decades. Providing 
care for a growing aging population will be one the most significant challenges 
faced by Iranian families. However, do all the families have the resources to 
look after their older members? The simple answer is that in the case of the 
vast majority they do not have sufficient resources, but continue to do so out 
of familial and humanitarian solidarity at a cost to themselves, in particular to 
the female members; care is a very gender-based activity all over the world. 
Family support should also be put in the context of declining the average 
household size in Iran, that changed from 5.1 in 1986 to 4 persons in 2006 
(Aghajanian and Thompson 2013). Moreover, nuclear family, which as the 
percentage of total households increased from in 79.2 percent 1986 to 83.8 
percent in 2006 (Aghajanian and Thompson 2013), has replaced multi-
family/generational households further reducing the capacity of the family to 
provide old age care.  
In the absence of adequate family resources, there is a need for social 
policy measures that would supplement family resources and support the broad 
developmental agenda and ensure societal and macro-level inter-generational 
support. The most basic objective of any state intervention is to maintain and 
increase families' resource base. This is different from a hands-off state policy 
leaving care issues to the family that effectively increases the burden on the 
family and women within it. 
In the context of inter-generational support, state intervention could have 
the objective of improving the family budget through subsidies and de-
commodifying (through regulation and intervention in the market) of the basic 
necessities of life. De-commodification does not necessarily mean the free 
provision of goods and services. It could take different forms such as rent 
control, subsidized medicine and staple food, and subsidized education7. It is 
of note that some of these subsidies like that to education are not directed at 
                                                 
7 De-commodification has to be put in the context of the existing subsidies such as 
fuel and energy which may be of greater benefit to high-income groups. The reform 
of such subsidy structure has to be combined with a de-commodification/subsidy 
structure that would benefit the low and middle-income groups.  
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elderly but by freeing resources at family level indirectly contribute to the 
family budget and thus improve its capacity to care. Moreover, old age could 
be set as a target for direct subsidies to the elderly; the most obvious example 
is state-sponsored health insurance and subsidies to medicine for chronic 
diseases that are usually associated with age. For example, studies of household 
expenditure on health and food in Iran revealed a high degree of inequality; the 
Gini coefficient of inequality was 0.48 between 1998 and 2012 (Ghiasvand, et 
al., 2015) and out-of-pocket expenses comprised 54 percent of household 
health expenditure over the same period (WHO, Global Health Expenditure 
database, quoted in Giasvand, et al., 2015). In 2014, the Health Evolution Plan 
of Iran was introduced with the main objective, inter alia, of reducing the out-
of-pocket expenses and reducing the burden of healthcare expenditure on low 
income families that has had some success in meeting its objectives, but its 
sustainability is in questions given its financing costs (Moradi-Lakeh and 
Vosoogh-Moghaddam, 2015). 
In summary, although Iran’s rapid fertility decline and population aging 
have important social and economic implications, they should not be seen as 
demographic catastrophes. Such views could hinder positive public and policy 
responses; as witnessed by the pro-natalist policies promoted by the most 
powerful conservative political leaders in Iran, who have called for the 
downgrading and even withdrawal of family planning services. Demographic 
transition and population ageing, instead, should be understood as a genuinely 
new situation which will significantly affect the economy, pension system, 
public policies, labor force, as well as health care system in Iran.  
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